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FERC NET METERING DECISIONS KEEP 
STATES IN THE DARK 
BENJAMIN HANNA* 
Abstract: As the effects of climate change increasingly become a reality, poli-
cymakers have recognized the need for more renewable energy, such as wind and 
solar power, and the benefits of distributed generation. One important way that 
both renewable energy and distributed generation are being addressed is through 
the use of electrical net metering policies. Net metering allows property owners 
to generate their own electricity and to receive credit from their utility company 
for any excess. State net metering policies are pervasive—forty-three states and 
the District of Columbia have adopted some form of net metering—and yet un-
certainty remains about their jurisdictional limits. Further, FERC’s guidelines on 
net metering are unclear and are preventing state policies from reaching their full 
potential. This Note reviews the net metering rules of three different states and 
analyzes the useful aspects of each. It then argues that FERC should provide 
clearer guidelines that allow states to expand their net metering policies and more 
effectively foster distributed renewable energy generation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans installed photovoltaic (“PV”) solar energy systems at a record 
pace in 2013, increasing the total amount of energy produced by PV solar en-
ergy systems in the United States to over 12,000 megawatts.1 In fact, more so-
lar energy systems have been installed in the United States during the past 
eighteen months than in the prior thirty years.2 And yet, even though the cost 
of installing solar energy systems is decreasing, they remain beyond the reach 
of many electricity consumers, unless they come with financial incentives.3 
One such incentive is net metering, a utility billing mechanism that allows 
customers with on-site generation systems to store excess electricity on the 
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–
2015. 
 1 Mike Munsell, U.S. Solar Market Grew 41%, Had Record Year in 2013, GREENTECH MEDIA 
(Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/u.s.-solar-market-grows-41-has-record-
year-in-2013, archived at http://perma.cc/5XGU-A43Z. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id.; see Shannon Baker-Branstetter, Distributed Renewable Generation: The Trifecta of Energy 
Solutions to Curb Carbon Emissions, Reduce Pollutants, and Empower Ratepayers, 22 VILL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 7 (2011). 
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grid.4 Those customers can then use the value of that stored electricity later to 
offset their consumption if their on-site generation system does not meet their 
demands.5 Net metering is the most common incentive for solar installations 
and other forms of distributed renewable energy generation such as wind and 
geothermal.6 It is so common that as of July, 2013, forty-three states and the 
District of Columbia had net metering policies in place.7 
The federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over the interstate 
transmission of electricity as well as the interstate sale of wholesale8 electrici-
ty.9 Retail energy sales10 and intrastate transmission and distribution, on the 
other hand, fall within state jurisdictions.11 Given the complex system of pow-
er distribution in the United States and the ephemeral nature of energy, certain 
transfers of electricity within the federal system can raise jurisdictional prob-
lems.12 To avoid these issues, states have attempted to shape net metering laws 
that maximize the efficacy of their renewable energy policies without over-
stepping their jurisdictional boundaries.13 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has resolved juris-
dictional disputes regarding state net metering policies in two significant deci-
                                                                                                                           
 4 SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, RATEMAKING, SOLAR VALUE AND SOLAR NET ENERGY METER-
ING—A PRIMER 1 (2013), available at https://www.solarelectricpower.org/media/51299/sepa-nem-
report-0713-print.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6LMH-5FQ9. The “grid” refers to the vast network 
of high voltage transmission lines that move electricity from power plants to substations throughout 
the United States. Electricity Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy
explained/index.cfm?page=electricity_delivery (last updated July 9, 2012), archived at http://perma.
cc/7FEB-HRP2. Electricity then moves from the substations to consumers along lower voltage distri-
bution lines. Id. 
 5 SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 4, at 1. 
 6 LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS ASSO-
CIATED WITH THE EXPANDED ADOPTION OF DISTRIBUTED SOLAR 33 (2013), available at http://
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/60613.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q6SD-A8RG (follow the archival 
link and open the “PDF” tab to access the document); Steven Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law: Power 
Navigates the Supremacy Clause, 24 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 267, 268 (2012)[hereinafter Ferrey, 
Virtual “Nets” and Law]; see Renewable Energy, ENERGY.GOV, http://www.energy.gov/science-
innovation/energy-sources/renewable-energy (last visited Oct. 15, 2014) archived at 
http://perma.cc/U2GV-PZXF. Distributed renewable energy generation refers to electricity produced 
from systems distributed throughout the grid rather than from a single, centralized power plant. See 
infra notes 24–45 and accompanying text. 
 7 Net Metering, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (Sept. 2014), 
http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/net_metering_map.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/UR6K-ZXYS. 
 8 A wholesale sale is any transaction for electricity between two entities that are not the end users. 
FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 763 (2d ed. 2006). 
 9 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012). 
 10 A retail sale of electricity is a direct sale to the end user. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 
763; see infra notes 46–52 and accompanying text. 
 11 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). 
 12 Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 269, 321–22. 
 13 Id. at 321; see infra notes 243–68 and accompanying text. 
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sions.14 These decisions, however, were both adjudications rather than rule-
makings and are thus limited to the specific facts of each case.15 Due to the 
rapid growth in the use of on-site renewable energy and the corresponding de-
velopment of state net metering policies, the specific facts that gave rise to 
those decisions are insufficient guideposts for states.16 Despite the lack of gen-
eral policy guidance from the FERC decisions, states are continuing to design 
creative net metering policies to encourage the use of on-site renewable elec-
tricity.17 
This Note argues that given the pervasive use and success of state net me-
tering regulations, FERC should provide clearer guidelines through rule mak-
ing that allow states to continue to be laboratories of net metering policies, but 
to do so within a more predictable and secure regulatory environment.18 Part I 
begins by explaining the mechanics of net metering and its role in the electrici-
ty marketplace.19 It then explores the federal policies related to net metering.20 
Part II reviews the two crucial FERC decisions, MidAmerican Energy Co. in 
2001 and Sun Edison, LLC in 2009.21 Part III then examines the net metering 
policies of Colorado, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, to demonstrate innova-
tive state approaches to follow.22 And finally, part IV analyzes and contrasts 
the three state policies and, based on that analysis, argues that current FERC 
regulatory guidance should be updated given the importance of net metering to 
renewable energy growth.23 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Sun Edison, LLC, 129 FERC ¶ 61146, 61618 (2009) (finding that net metering is lawful 
when there is no net transfer of electricity from a customer to a utility at the end of a billing period); 
MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC ¶ 61340, 62261 (2001) (finding that federal law governs when an 
electricity-producing customer has sold more power to the utility than the customer has purchased from 
the utility over the course of the billing period). 
 15 Sun Edison, LLC, 129 FERC ¶ 61618; MidAmerican, 94 FERC ¶ 62261; Ferrey, Virtual 
“Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 307, 309. 
 16 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, § 140 (2012) (providing an example of an innovative 
state policy that allocates net metering credits to multiple customers from a single renewable energy 
source); Eric Wesoff, Updated: Capital Keeps Pouring into Booming US Residential Solar Market, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Capital-Keeps-
Pouring-into-Booming-US-Residential-Solar-Market, archived at http://perma.cc/LW2P-RTJB. 
 17 See Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 280–88. 
 18 See infra notes 269–85. 
 19 See infra notes 24–70 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 71–109 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 110–33 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 134–202 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 203–85 and accompanying text. 
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I. A HISTORY OF NET METERING POLICY AND REGULATION 
A. Net Metering in Context 
1. The Basics—Distributed Generation and Net Metering 
Net metering is a utility billing mechanism that allows customers who 
generate their own power to send excess electricity back onto the grid.24 This 
essentially permits these customers to run their electricity usage meters back-
wards when they produce more electricity than they need, offsetting their elec-
tricity bills with the power generated on-site.25 The excess power produced by 
the customer’s on-site generation system, such as rooftop solar panels, is sent 
back to the grid and is then consumed by other customers.26 Different state 
policies grant the customer credits for that excess electricity, and some state 
policies permit the customer to allocate credits to other consumers.27 
Net metering policies incentivize building owners to generate the electric-
ity that is consumed at that site on a daily basis; a power generation practice 
known as distributed generation.28 It is known as distributed generation be-
cause the systems used to produce the power, such as rooftop solar panels, geo-
thermal sources, or wind turbines, are distributed throughout the grid.29 Alt-
hough this contrasts with the centralized model of power production in the 
United States that dominated the twentieth century, on-site power generation is 
not a novel concept.30 Before the advent of large-scale steam turbines, energy 
requirements were met through on-site generation.31 Even as the power genera-
tion system became increasingly centralized, electricity consumers that re-
quired reliable power, such as hospitals and telecommunications centers, rec-
                                                                                                                           
 24 SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 4, at 1. 
 25 Ker Than, As Solar Power Grows, Dispute Flares Over U.S. Utility Bills, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
(Dec. 24, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/12/131226-utilities-dispute-
net-metering-for-solar/, archived at http://perma.cc/E5LJ-RP7U. Electricity generated on-site is pro-
duced at the place of consumption, such as on a residential rooftop. See BIRD ET AL., supra note 6, at 
33. 
 26 Non-Discriminatory Open Access Transmission Tariff, 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(2012). Another way 
net metering is commonly conceptualized is as an energy banking system, whereby the customer 
sends excess power to the grid for storage, and then may draw from that energy stock at a later time at 
no additional cost. Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 271. 
 27 See infra notes 134–202 and accompanying text (reviewing state net metering policies and the 
various choices those policies give consumers). 
 28 Melissa Powers, Small Is (Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. Energy Policies to Increase Local-
ized Renewable Energy Generation, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 595, 599–600, 635–36 (2012). 
 29 Frederick R. Fucci, Distributed Generation, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND 
RENEWABLES 345, 345–47 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011). 
 30 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND RATE-
RELATED ISSUES THAT MAY IMPEDE THEIR EXPANSION, at i (2007), available at http://www.ferc.
gov/legal/fed-sta/exp-study.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R4TY-XTEY; Fucci, supra note 29, at 
345. 
 31 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at i. 
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ognized the benefits of having their own generation capabilities in emergency 
situations.32 
Distributed generation differs from conventional power production and 
transmission in a variety of ways.33 First, the central station model of power 
generation wastes a tremendous amount of energy: approximately two-thirds 
of all fuel used to generate electricity in the United States is lost as heat during 
the generation process.34 Second, centralized power sources require the elec-
tricity to be transported long distances to reach end-users, and during transit, 
another 7% to 10% of the electricity is lost.35 In contrast, a distributed genera-
tion system has less transmission loss because the electricity travels a short 
distance before being used.36 
Distributed generation also produces environmental benefits.37 In 2012, 
electricity generation accounted for approximately thirty-nine percent of the 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted by the United States.38 Net metering policies 
incentivize the development of distributed renewable power.39 Distributed gen-
eration from renewable energy sources such as solar in turn, benefits the envi-
ronment by reducing CO2 emissions.40 Distributed generation systems, particu-
larly those placed on rooftops, also require less land than centralized power 
plants and their accompanying transmission infrastructure.41 
Distributed generation also provides reliability to electricity consumers in 
a way that traditional centralized generation often fails to do.42 They do so 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Id. 
 33 See Fucci, supra note 29, at 345–47. 
 34 Id. at 346. 
 35 Id. at 345–46. (resulting in approximately 73% to 76% usable electricity losses due to genera-
tion an transmission). 
 36 See Baker-Branstetter, supra note 3, at 3. One study found that distributed generation systems 
can reduce transmission losses by thirty percent. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at 3-18. 
 37 DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at 8. 
 38 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.
cfm?id=77&t=11 (last updated Aug. 23, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/J95T-QVKX. 
 39 Baker-Branstetter, supra note 3, at 8. Approximately three quarters of CO2 emissions from 
electricity generation come from coal power stations, whereas the other quarter comes from natural 
gas power stations. Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at 6-1, 6-14. 
 42 Fucci, supra note 29, at 347. Reliability is a measure of the grid’s ability to meet consumers’ 
demand for electricity. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at 2-1. In the wake of the devastation 
caused by Hurricane Sandy in October, 2012, President Obama created the Hurricane Sandy Rebuild-
ing Task Force (the “Task Force”) to identify and remove “obstacles to resilient rebuilding while 
taking into account existing and future risks and promoting the long-term sustainability of communi-
ties and ecosystems in the Sandy-affected region.” HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE, 
HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING STRATEGY 13 (2013), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
documents/huddoc?id=HSRebuildingStrategy.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EKL2-5D36. Among 
the Task Force’s recommendations was to improve electric grid operations by incorporating distribut-
ed generation. Id. at 68. The Task Force noted that increasing distributed generation would assist in 
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simply by diversifying the sources that supply electricity.43 As such, disrup-
tions like blackouts and brownouts can be prevented by distributing power 
sources throughout the grid.44 Distributed generation systems can also provide 
supplemental or back-up power to critical consumers like hospitals.45 
2. Electricity Ratemaking 
Net metering encourages building owners to install on-site renewable 
power generators by guaranteeing that the local utility will compensate the 
customer for any excess electricity.46 The value of the credit granted by the 
utility for the customer’s self-produced power is key to determining whether 
the investment in an on-site generator is worth it, and if so, how quickly the 
investment will pay off.47 More simply stated, how the price of electricity is set 
has significant impacts on the renewable energy generator’s rate of return.48 
The retail price of electricity is based on its reasonable cost of production.49 
The rate a utility may charge is typically set in a “ratemaking” proceeding, at 
which a utility considers what the reasonable cost of the various components of 
delivering electricity is likely to be.50 The components of retail prices typically 
include transmission and distribution costs, such as the cost of power lines and 
facilities, as well as the cost of generation.51 It also incorporates the fixed costs 
of serving customers, such as metering and billing.52 
                                                                                                                           
minimizing problems to the grid and allow at least a minimum level of service to consumers in the 
event of another catastrophic storm. Id. 
 43 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at 2-5. 
 44 SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 4, at 28. Blackouts might be caused by equipment 
failure and overload or as a deliberate emergency technique implemented by system operators to avoid 
system overload. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at 2-2. Distributed generation systems can 
support local electricity demand and thus reduce the stress on primary generation systems. Id. at 2-5. 
 45 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, i. Distributed generation can also be incentivized 
through the use of feed-in tariffs (“FITs”). See Steven Ferrey, Sale of Electricity, in THE LAW OF 
CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 217, 228 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011) [hereinafter 
Ferrey, Sale of Electricity]; Powers, supra note 28, at 641. FITs provide a guaranteed rate of return to 
renewable generation investors by setting a price for the power produced by renewables above market 
value. Ferrey, Sale of Electricity, supra at 228. This raised price thus appeals to investors otherwise 
concerned with the upfront costs of a renewable energy installation. Id.; Powers, supra note 28, at 
641. FITs are the most popular form of renewable energy policy incentive in Europe. Ferrey, Sale of 
Electricity, supra at 228. 
 46 Baker-Branstetter, supra note 3, at 7. 
 47 See Powers, supra note 28, at 637. 
 48 See id. 
 49 Ferrey, Sale of Electricity, supra note 45, at 217. FERC regulates the pricing of wholesale 
electricity that is sold in interstate commerce, whereas state regulatory boards regulate retail rates. Id. 
 50 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at 8-3 to -4. The state utility board, which may be elect-
ed or appointed depending on the jurisdiction, ultimately sets the utility’s rates and other rules regulat-
ing service. Id. at 8-4. 
 51 Id. at 8-3 to -4. 
 52 Id. at 8-3. 
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Due to the many components and considerations that comprise the retail 
rate of electricity, the cost of the power itself is only part of the bundle.53 In 
some jurisdictions, such as Massachusetts, regulators must also consider en-
couraging environmentally friendly technologies like solar generation.54 The 
regulators must then account for these different priorities and also keep rates 
predictable and understandable to the public.55 
There are many components and considerations that comprise the retail 
rate of electricity, with the cost of the actual electricity only accounting for part 
of the figure.56 Jurisdictions differ as to whether net metering households 
should be compensated for the power they produce at the retail rate or, instead, 
for just the cash value of the power itself—known as the avoided cost rate.57 
Customers whose meters run backwards at the retail rate can receive up to four 
times the value of the electricity.58 Meanwhile, the customer does not incur any 
of the other costs embedded within the retail rate such as transmission and dis-
tribution costs.59 
Net metering customers who are paid at the retail rate for their excess 
electricity can thus cause the electricity utility company to lose revenue be-
cause only the utility incurs the distribution and transmission costs, but the 
customers are compensated as if they incurred them as well.60 A utility might 
then attempt to recover these costs by assessing a surcharge across its entire 
customer base—both net metering customers and traditional customers.61 This 
results in non-net metering customers effectively subsidizing net metering cus-
tomers.62 Various states where net metering occurs are attempting to resolve 
this issue.63 In Arizona, for example, regulators are attempting to assess a small 
                                                                                                                           
 53 SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 4, at 5. 
 54 Id. at 6. For example, the Massachusetts Green Communities Act of 2008 required electricity 
distribution companies to provide retail access to sellers of renewable energy. Massachusetts Green 
Communities Act, Ch. 169, § 86, 2008 Mass. Acts 284. 
 55 Massachusetts Green Communities Act, Ch. 169, § 86, 2008 Mass. Acts 284. 
 56 Powers, supra note 28, at 637. 
 57 See STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER 4:1 (30th ed. 2013) [hereinafter 
FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER] (describing avoided cost as the price the utility would 
pay to generate the electricity itself or purchase it from a source other than the customer); Ferrey, 
Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 280–88 (comparing state policies and noting that some states 
give net metering customers the retail rate whereas others give the avoided cost rate). 
 58 Ferrey, Sale of Electricity, supra note 45, at 232. 
 59 Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 303. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
63 See, e.g., Ryan Randazzo, Commission Votes to Raise APS Solar Customers’ Bills, AZCENTRAL 
(Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.azcentral.com/business/arizonaeconomy/articles/20131114aps-solar-
customer-bills-higher.html, archived at http://perma.cc/84TA-MZZW. 
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fee on net metering customers to offset utility revenue losses caused by cus-
tomer-generated electricity payouts at the retail rate.64 
B. Federal Underpinnings of Net Metering 
1. The Federal Power Act 
The Federal Power Act (FPA) grants FERC jurisdiction over the transmis-
sion of electricity in interstate commerce, the sale of wholesale electricity in 
interstate commerce, and any facilities used for those purposes.65 The FPA de-
fines the sale of electricity at wholesale as the sale of electricity to any person 
for resale.66 It limits federal jurisdiction to the three aforementioned areas by 
specifying that FERC has no authority “over facilities used for the generation 
of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the 
transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce.”67 
FERC’s jurisdiction over interstate transmission and wholesale electricity 
sales includes the authority to regulate rates and schedules.68 Furthermore, the 
FPA gives FERC the power to change a rate or a rule it finds unreasonable.69 In 
furtherance of this authority, the FPA prohibits terms of service that are unrea-
sonable or unduly preferential as between different classes of customers.70 
2. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
Following the oil crisis of the 1970s, Congress passed the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”) with the goal of encouraging co-
generation and small-scale power production.71 With PURPA, Congress sought 
energy efficiency through conservation, streamlined use of utility facilities and 
resources, and fair electric rates for consumers.72 Congress further aimed to 
diversify the country’s energy portfolio by encouraging the development of 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Id. 
 65 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)–(b) (2012). The FPA defines electric energy in inter-
state commerce as electricity transmitted from a state and consumed anywhere outside that state but 
within the United States. Id. § 824(c). 
 66 See id. § 824(d). 
 67 See id. § 824(b)(1). 
 68 See id. § 824d(a)–(e). A schedule in the electric utility context refers to a listing of all rates and 
charges that are included in any transmission or sale of electricity. See id. § 824d(c). Rates that a utili-
ty may charge for electricity are based on the cost to the utility of providing the service, plus allowing 
the utility to earn a fair rate of return to remain in business. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 78. 
 69 See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). 
 70 Id. § 824d(b) (2012). 
 71 Id. § 824a-3(a); Joshua Fershee, Renewable Mandates and Goals, in THE LAW OF CLEAN EN-
ERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 77, 77 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011). 
 72 FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 57, at 4:1; see 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) 
to -3(c) (requiring utilities to buy electricity from, and sell electricity to, small power producers at just 
and reasonable rates). 
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alternative power.73 It recognized that two underlying problems with the ener-
gy industry were the reluctance of the utilities to deal with alternative power 
producers and alternative producers’ fear of regulation.74 
PURPA attempted to address those problems and to achieve Congress’s 
goals by creating a class of facilities that would receive special regulatory 
treatment and financial incentives.75 Pursuant to PURPA, FERC defined the 
characteristics necessary for a facility to be deemed a “qualifying facility” 
(“QF”) and receive the attendant benefits.76 FERC rules focus on the size and 
fuel use of a facility to determine whether it is a QF.77 A small power produc-
tion facility is a QF if it generates eighty megawatts (“MW”) or less and its 
primary energy source is biomass, waste, renewable resources, or geothermal 
resources.78 Along with small renewable power generators, cogeneration facili-
ties may also obtain QF status.79 
QFs receive three benefits under PURPA: (1) the right to sell energy to a 
utility, (2) the right to purchase certain services from utilities, and (3) exemp-
tion from different regulatory burdens.80 Further, utilities are required to pur-
chase electricity from a QF at the avoided cost rate.81 The first two benefits 
impose obligations directly upon utilities to physically connect with and pur-
chase power from QFs.82 PURPA thus breaks up the monopoly on generation 
of power that utilities would otherwise hold.83 
The exemption of QFs from a variety of federal and state regulations is 
another important benefit provided by PURPA.84 QFs are exempt from parts of 
both the FPA and the Public Utility Holding Company Act (“PUHCA”).85 As a 
general rule, however, QFs are not exempt from Sections 205 and 206 of the 
                                                                                                                           
 73 FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 57, at 4:1; see 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) 
(requiring FERC to make rules encouraging the development of small-scale electricity generation). 
 74 FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 57, at 4:1. 
 75 Craig M. Kline, Solar, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 391, 
402 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011). 
 76 Fucci, supra note 29, at 349. 
 77 18 C.F.R. § 292.203 (2013). FERC initially included certain ownership criteria for QFs, pro-
hibiting facilities in which electric utility companies had greater than fifty percent stake. Fucci, supra 
note 29, at 349. The utility ownership restriction has been repealed. Id. 
 78 18 C.F.R. § 292.204(a)–(b). A primary energy source is one that comprises at least seventy-five 
percent of the input at the facility. Id. § 292.204(b). 
 79 Id. § 292.203(b). The production of electricity produces a tremendous amount of wasted ener-
gy, often in the form of heat. Fucci, supra note 29, at 346. A cogeneration facility is one that captures 
this thermal energy and puts it to use. Id. 
 80 Kline, supra note 75, at 402; see 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a), 824a-3(e) (2012) (requiring utilities to 
purchase electricity from, and sell electricity to, QFs and exempting QFs from several federal and 
state regulations). 
 81 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)(2). 
 82 FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 57, at 4:1. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 4:6. 
 85 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e). 
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FPA, which provide for FERC jurisdiction over interstate sales of wholesale 
electricity and interstate transmission.86 QFs that generate less than twenty 
MW, however, are an exception to that general rule—they are exempt from 
FERC scrutiny under Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA.87 
Furthermore, QFs’ corporate and financial structures are not subject to 
federal review, and FERC cannot scrutinize their sales of power or their profit 
margins.88 PURPA also exempts QFs from most state regulations.89 Specifical-
ly, QFs are exempted from state regulations regarding rates as well as financial 
and organizational structures.90 
3. Energy Policy Act of 2005 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPACT”) encouraged the widespread 
adoption of net metering policies at the state level.91 Under EPACT, state regu-
latory commissions and electric utilities are required to make net metering ser-
vices available upon request.92 Although some states had net metering policies 
in place prior to EPACT’s passage in 2005, the statute encouraged a jump in 
the number of state net metering programs, and today forty-three states and the 
District of Columbia have some form of net metering policy.93 
EPACT also limited the application of PURPA by narrowing the obligations 
of utilities to purchase power from QFs.94 Utilities are no longer required to pur-
chase power from a QF that has access to wholesale electricity markets.95 Utili-
ties also need not provide transmission services to a QF that is already receiving 
                                                                                                                           
 86 18 C.F.R. § 292.601(c)(1) (2013); see 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)–824(b) (2012) (granting FERC juris-
diction over the transmission of electricity in interstate commerce, the sale of wholesale electricity in 
interstate commerce, and any facilities used for those purposes). 
 87 18 C.F.R. § 292.601(c)(1). 
 88 FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 57, at 4:1; Fucci, supra note 29, at 
349. 
 89 Fucci, supra note 29, at 349. 
 90 18 C.F.R. § 292.602(c). FERC will consider limiting these exemptions upon the request of a 
state regulatory board. Id. § 292.602(c)(3). 
 91 Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(11); SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 
4, at 1. 
 92 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(11) (2012) 
 93 SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 4, at 2; Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, 
at 273. In 1983, Minnesota was the first state to enact a net metering policy. SOLAR ELEC. POWER 
ASS’N, supra note 4, at 1. Today, Alabama, Idaho, Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee and Texas are the only states without a statewide policy. Id. 
 94 See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(m)(1) (2012). Investor-owned utilities fought to reduce the application 
of PURPA and took particular issue with PURPA’s requirement that they purchase power from QFs at 
a set rate. Fucci, supra note 29, at 350. PURPA’s requirements did lead to abuses such as cogenera-
tion facilities using a small fraction of captured thermal energy to warm a greenhouse in order to gain 
QF status, while selling the majority of their energy to utilities, which were required to buy from 
them. Id. 
 95 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(m)(1). 
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those services from another transmission provider.96 Furthermore, if a competi-
tive marketplace exists for the QF’s electricity—such that the local utility is not 
the only potential buyer—the local utility can be exempted from PURPA pur-
chase obligations.97 The practical effect of the EPACT amendments is that many 
utilities are or can become exempt from purchasing electricity from QFs.98 Other 
than decreased obligations to deal with QFs however, most of the original sub-
stantive requirements of PURPA still apply to QFs after EPACT.99 
4. The Supremacy Clause in Electricity Markets: The Filed Rate Doctrine 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution establishes that 
the Constitution and all federal laws made pursuant to it are the “supreme law 
of the land.”100 State constitutions, laws and regulations are thus deferential to 
lawful exercises of power by the federal government when the two intersect.101 
In 1935, Congress, using its right to delegate its authority, vested in the 
Federal Power Commission—now FERC—jurisdiction over the interstate 
transmission and interstate wholesale sale of electricity.102 Further, courts have 
confirmed that FERC’s power over the interstate sale of electricity is plena-
ry.103 Thus, any state law attempting to regulate interstate transmission or 
wholesale electricity sales is de facto preempted by federal law.104 
The filed rate doctrine (the “FRD”) is the application of the Supremacy 
Clause to the regulation of electricity.105 A utility that transmits or sells power 
in interstate commerce is regulated by FERC.106 The utility must file the terms 
of its rates and services with FERC and receive approval from the agency.107 
The FRD provides that once the federally regulated utility has satisfied the fil-
ing requirement, and FERC approves its rates or terms of service, any state 
action differing from FERC’s findings is federally preempted.108 Furthermore, 
the FRD bars all claims, state or federal, that attempt to change FERC-
approved rates or terms of service.109 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Fucci, supra note 29, at 350. 
 99 FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 57, at 4:1. 
 100 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 101 Id. 
 102 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012). 
 103 Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison, 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964) (holding that Congress 
intended to create a bright line rule in granting FERC exclusive authority over interstate sale of elec-
tricity); N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 344 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Minn. 1984). 
 104 Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 315. 
 105 Id. 
 106 16 U.S.C. § 824(a). 
 107 Id. § 824d(c). 
 108 Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 315. 
 109 Id. at 315–16. 
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II. FERC ORDERS DEFINE NET METERING 
A. MidAmerican 
In a 2001 order, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) ad-
dressed MidAmerican Energy Company’s (“MidAmerican”) concerns with net 
metering.110 MidAmerican objected to the Iowa Utilities Board’s (“Iowa 
Board”) implementation of orders requiring MidAmerican to offer net meter-
ing service to three small wind facilities.111 The company filed a petition with 
FERC seeking a declaratory order that the Iowa Board’s requirements were 
preempted by the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act (“PURPA”).112 MidAmerican specifically argued that the state 
orders essentially required it to pay retail rates in violation of PURPA, which 
stipulates that qualifying facilities (“QFs”) such as the wind turbines at issue, 
were only entitled to avoided cost rates.113 Further, rather than netting the total 
amount of power at the end of each billing cycle, MidAmerican argued that 
every flow of power, in either direction, constituted a sale.114 
FERC denied MidAmerican’s request for a declaratory order and found 
that the Iowa Board had the authority to implement its net metering require-
ments.115 FERC did not view the Iowa board’s net metering requirements as 
dealing with the sale of electricity, but rather as a method of accounting for the 
transactions between the utility and the net metering customers.116 It held that 
“no sale occurs when an individual homeowner or farmer (or similar entity 
such as a business) installs generation and accounts for its dealings with the 
utility through the practice of net metering.”117 
Because according to FERC, federal law applies when a sale occurs, the 
MidAmerican decision was quite significant.118 In the context of net metering, 
a sale occurs when the customer has sold more power to the utility than the 
customer has purchased from the utility over the course of the billing period.119 
                                                                                                                           
 110 MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC ¶ 61340, 62261 (2001). 
 111 Id. Two of the wind turbines were twenty kilowatts in size, whereas the third was forty-five 
kilowatts. Id. ¶ 62261 n.3. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id.; see supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text (defining the avoided cost rate). 
 114 MidAmerican, 94 FERC ¶ 62263. 
 115 Id. ¶ 62262. 
 116 Id. ¶ 62263. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. In its order, FERC also held that one month is an allowable time interval during which the 
net metering process may take place. Id. Previously, FERC had only permitted net metering to be 
measured over a one-hour interval, though it stated that it was open to considering other time periods. 
Id. Because the determination as to whether federal law applies focuses on whether the customer has 
made a net sale at the end of the billing cycle, the allowable length of the billing cycle is crucial. See 
id. 
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It is only when a net sale to the utility has occurred that the inquiry then shifts 
to the status of the net metering facility under PURPA.120 
Although the MidAmerican decision was significant, it was nonetheless 
an adjudication and not a binding rulemaking.121 Its precedential value is thus 
limited to the facts of the case.122 Despite its limited scope, MidAmerican is 
viewed by scholars as representing FERC’s approval of state net metering pol-
icies.123 
B. Sun Edison 
In 2009, in Sun Edison, LLC, Sun Edison, a company that finances, in-
stalls, operates, and maintains solar energy facilities, petitioned FERC to clari-
fy whether the company’s sales to end-use customers constituted a wholesale 
sale of electricity that would subject it to the FPA.124 Sun Edison’s business 
model is to install, connect, and maintain solar facilities on the customer’s 
property.125 The customer pays little of the upfront costs of solar installation, 
but agrees to purchase the electricity directly from Sun Edison.126 In states 
with net metering policies, customers are then able to send their excess power 
to the grid.127 Sun Edison sought FERC’s assurance that its electricity was not 
considered wholesale even though it was occasionally resold to utilities in net 
metering states.128 
In keeping with its decision in MidAmerican, FERC found that no sale 
occurs as long as the end-use customer that purchases Sun Edison’s solar ener-
gy does not make a net sale to the utility over the given billing period.129 When 
no sale occurs from the customer to the utility, no resale has taken place and 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Id. If a QF makes a net sale to the utility, then the QF is only entitled to be compensated at the 
avoided cost rate pursuant to PURPA. Id. If a non-QF makes a net sale at the end of the billing cycle, 
then the facility would be subject to the FPA. Id. 
 121 Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 305. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See id. at 307; Powers, supra note 28, at 637. Transferring credits among customers was not at 
issue in MidAmerican, and thus FERC did not contemplate the “virtual” net metering scenario that 
Massachusetts, for example, has adopted. See infra notes 142–55 and accompanying text (explaining 
Massachusetts’ virtual net metering policy that allows a customer generating her own electricity to 
allocate credits to other customers). 
 124 Sun Edison, LLC, 129 FERC ¶ 61146, 61618 (2009). 
 125 Id. Since Sun Edison’s founding in 2003, other solar leasing companies have formed using a 
similar business model. See William Pentland, Another Day, Another $1 Billion for Distributed Solar, 
FORBES (June 26, 2013, 11:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2013/06/26/
another-day-another-1-billion-for-distributed-solar/, archived at http://perma.cc/YK7H-6Z7J. 
 126 Sun Edison,129 FERC ¶ 61618. 
 127 Id. ¶ 61619. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. ¶ 61621. 
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Sun Edison is not viewed to be selling at wholesale.130 FERC thus held that 
Sun Edison’s sales were beyond the purview of the FPA.131 
FERC’s Sun Edison order further clarified that a customer’s net consump-
tion of electricity is determinative of a sale when it stated, “[a] participant in a 
net metering program must be a net consumer of electricity—but for portions 
of the day or portions of the billing cycle, it may produce more electricity than 
it can use itself.”132 After this decision, net metering is considered permissible 
when there is no net transfer to a utility at the end of a billing period.133 
III. STATE NET METERING POLICIES 
A. Overview of State Variations 
Forty-three states and Washington, D.C. had net metering policies in 
place by the end of 2013.134 These policies vary in the sources of renewable 
energy covered, the eligible size and capacity of the generator, and how the 
customer is compensated.135 Many states have an aggregate cap that limits how 
much electricity net metering customers can contribute to the grid overall.136 
States with aggregate caps require customers hoping to take advantage of net 
metering to reserve spots before capacity is filled.137 
The states with the most liberal net metering policies allow multiple cus-
tomers to benefit from a single renewable energy facility without being physi-
cally connected to the renewable source.138 These policies, known as “commu-
nity” or “virtual” net metering, allow neighbors to offset their utility bills as if 
                                                                                                                           
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. ¶ 61620. Like MidAmerican Energy Co., the Sun Edison, LLC order was an adjudication 
and thus limited to the particular facts of the case. Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 
309. A rule promulgated by an administrative agency such as FERC is a “statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.” 
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012). A declaratory order, such as Sun Edison or MidAmerican, is simply meant 
to “terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty.” See id. § 554(e); Sun Edison, 129 FERC ¶ 61621; 
MidAmerican, 94 FERC ¶ 61340. A party must file a petition with FERC to request a declaratory 
order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty. 18 C.F.R. § 385.207 (2014). 
 133 Sun Edison, 129 FERC ¶ 61621. 
 134 Net Metering, supra note 7. 
 135 See Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 280–88 (giving an overview of the forty-
three state policies currently in place). 
 136 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, § 139(f) (2012) (capping the contribution by net meter-
ing customers to the state’s peak electricity demand at three percent); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-87(e)(1) 
(West 2013) (providing that a utility may stop offering net metering services when the total capacity 
of net metering customers equals two and a half percent of the state’s peak electricity demand). 
 137 See MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTIL., FACTSHEET: RULES ON NET METERING 1 (July 2013), avail-
able at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dpu/electric/net-metering/2013-7-2-net-metering-fact-sheet.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/86PK-635U. 
 138 Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 292. 
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they each had a generator system on their homes.139 Because neighbors are not 
actually connected to the renewable source, the utility grid is used to distribute 
the power amongst participants in the community.140 The utility incurs the dis-
tribution cost, but the net metering participants are compensated at the full re-
tail rate, as if they had incurred those costs.141 
B. Massachusetts Net Metering Policy 
Massachusetts first authorized net metering by renewable energy systems 
in 1982.142 Since then, the state’s net metering policies have been expanded 
and amended several times, and most significantly in 2008 with the passage of 
the Green Communities Act.143 
In its current form, Massachusetts’ net metering policy groups its eligible 
net metering facilities into three classes.144 Class I facilities, the smallest, must 
have a capacity of sixty kilowatts (kW) or less but have no restrictions on the 
source of the electricity.145 Class II and Class III facilities must generate elec-
tricity from solar, wind, anaerobic digestion, or an agricultural facility and may 
produce between sixty kW to one megawatt (MW) and one MW to two MW, 
respectively.146 
A net metering customer’s excess electricity is compensated differently 
depending on the customer’s class.147 Class I and II facilities receive nearly the 
full retail rate for excess generation, whereas Class III facilities receive closer 
to the avoided cost rate.148 Class III facilities are the largest allowed by the 
statute and most closely resemble a wholesale power producer.149 This is likely 
                                                                                                                           
 139 Net Metering: How Net Energy Works for Consumers, INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY 
COUNCIL, http://www.irecusa.org/regulatory-reform/net-metering/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/J9BY-6BXC. The policies vary from state to state, and are sometimes called 
aggregate or virtual net metering. Id. 
 140 Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 293. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Massachusetts Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, DATABASE OF STATE INCEN-
TIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_
Code=MA01R&re=0&ee=0 (last updated Aug. 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LA9Q-LTWD. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 18.02 (2013) (defining Class I, Class II, and Class III net meter-
ing facilities). 
 145 Id. Generation is the amount of electricity the system generates over a particular period of 
time. Frequently Asked Questions: What Is the Difference Between Electricity Generation Capacity 
and Electricity Generation?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?
id=101&t=3 (last updated Apr. 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/39LJ-BAT4. The capacity of an 
electric generation system refers to the maximum output the system can produce under certain condi-
tions. Id. 
 146 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 18.02. 
 147 Id. at 18.04(1)–.04(3). 
 148 Id.; Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 283. 
 149 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 18.02; Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 300. 
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why utilities are not required to compensate Class III facilities’ excess power at 
the retail rate.150 
One way that Massachusetts net metering regulations differ from other 
states is in their use of “virtual” credits.151 Any customer who owns a renewa-
ble energy generator—referred to as a “host customer” by the Massachusetts 
Department of Public Utilities—may allocate credits to any other customer of 
the same utility.152 The credits are then used by the non-host customers to off-
set their electric bills.153 
In Massachusetts, the non-host customer need only be within the same 
utility service area as the host, but does not need to be related legally or other-
wise in order to benefit from the host’s net metering credits.154 The utility is 
required to carry over from billing period to billing period any remaining net 
metering credits.155 
C. New Jersey Net Metering Policy 
New Jersey offers net metering to industrial, commercial, and residential 
customers that generate a “Class I” renewable resource.156 Class I renewable 
resources include solar, wind, geothermal, and tidal energy.157 The state used to 
limit the size of a customer’s on-site generation system to two MW, but in 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 300. Class III facilities owned by municipali-
ties or another government entity receive the same compensation for excess generation as Class I and 
II facilities. 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 18.04(1), .04(3) (2013). 
 151 Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 297. 
 152 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 18.05. 
 153 See id. 
 154 Id. at 18.05(1); Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 301. If the renewable genera-
tor is a Class III facility, then the utility has the option of giving the host customer the cash value of 
the excess electricity rather than allocating the credits to others. 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 18.05(4). If 
the host customer transfers net metering credits to a large pool of customers, the utility is more likely 
to write a check rather than face the administrative costs of many virtual net metering customers. 
Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 306. 
 155 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 18.05(3) (2013). Massachusetts’ net metering regulations also allow 
for third-party power producers to participate in the program. Id. at 18.09(5). Furthermore, a host 
customer is not required to consume a certain amount of the energy it produces. See id. at 18.05 (lack-
ing a requirement that a host customer use a minimum amount of the electricity produced on-site 
before allocating credits to other customers). In Massachusetts, excess generation from net metering 
facilities may contribute up to three percent of capacity during the utilities’ periods of peak demand. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, § 139(f) (2012). In January 2014, a bill was introduced in the Massachu-
setts legislature to allow all qualifying net metering projects to be built, regardless of the three percent 
cap, until December 31, 2016. Matt Murphy, Solar Backers Push to Lift Subsidy Cap, COMMON-
WEALTH MAG. (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.commonwealthmagazine.org/News-and-Features/Online-
exclusives/2014/Winter/029-Solar-backers-push-to-lift-subsidy-cap.aspx#.U1bHU1FdVps, archived 
at http://perma.cc/7K2B-PCPS. 
 156 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-87(e)(1) (West 2013). 
 157 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-1.2 (2014). 
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2010, removed the size limit.158 Despite the removal of a specific size limit, 
on-site generation capacity is limited by the requirement that the capacity not 
exceed the amount of electricity used by the customer over a prior twelve-
month period.159 Furthermore, a utility may, upon authorization from the New 
Jersey Board of Public Utilities, stop offering net metering services when net 
metering customers’ combined capacity equals two and a half percent of the 
state’s peak electricity demand.160 
If a customer generates excess power in a given month, the customer re-
ceives a credit—at the retail rate—for the next month’s bill.161 The customer 
may accumulate credits over the course of a year, but if there are credits re-
maining at the end of an annualized period, the utility compensates the cus-
tomer for the avoided cost value of the excess power.162 New Jersey net meter-
ing customers are further allowed to choose the month in which their annual 
billing cycle begins.163 The utility is also expressly prohibited from assessing a 
fee or surcharge to net metering customers, unless that fee applies to non-net 
metering customers as well.164 
 Unlike Massachusetts, New Jersey does not permit virtual net metering 
for private customers.165 Pursuant to New Jersey’s narrower allowance, an eli-
gibility requirement for net metering is that the energy generation system be 
located either on the property of the customer or on a contiguous property.166 
Furthermore, one energy generation system may only serve one customer.167 
This arrangement does, however, allow for “meter aggregation,” where a cus-
tomer uses a single renewable energy generation system to offset the utility 
costs at several buildings, provided the customer owns each building and the 
buildings are located on the same or contiguous property.168 New Jersey net 
metering regulations also allow third-party power producers to participate.169 
                                                                                                                           
 158 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-87(e)(1); New Jersey Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, 
DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/
incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=NJ03R&re=0&ee=0 (last updated Oct. 10, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/4NLE-XREA. 
 159 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-4.3(a). 
 160 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-87(e)(1). 
 161 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-4.3(c); Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law, supra note 6, at 285. 
 162 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-4.3(e). 
 163 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-4.3(f) (2014). The utility is only required to offer the customer one 
opportunity to select when the billing period starts. Id. 
 164 Id. § 14:8-4.3(m). 
 165 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-87(e)(4) (2012) (providing that only state entities may allocate net 
metering credits to multiple buildings or facilities); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-4.1(b)(3) (stipulating 
that a renewable energy generation system may only serve a single net metering customer). 
 166 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-4.1(b)(1)(i)–(ii). 
 167 Id. § 14:8-4.1(b)(3). 
 168 ARIZ. STATE UNIV. ENERGY POLICY INNOVATION COUNCIL, COMMUNITY, VIRTUAL AND 
AGGREGATE NET METERING, OH MY! 1 (2014), available at http://energypolicy.asu.edu/wp-content/
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In 2012, New Jersey passed legislation requiring utilities to allow public 
entities to engage in aggregate net metering.170 The statute allows for state, 
county, and municipal entities, as well as school districts, to share credits 
amongst their facilities from a single generation system.171 To qualify for 
community net metering in New Jersey, the energy must come from solar 
technology.172 In order to participate, the buildings or facilities whose bills will 
be offset must be owned by the same public entity, and must be on property 
owned by that entity.173 The facilities need not be on the same or contiguous 
property, but are still subject to several geographic limitations.174 All county, 
state, or municipal buildings seeking to aggregate their meters must be located 
within the service territory of a single utility and must be served by the same 
basic generation provider.175 Furthermore, state entities in particular must be 
located within five miles of each other to aggregate their meters.176 
Similar to private net metering customers, public entities are not required 
to limit the size of the solar generation system to a specific capacity.177 Public 
entities are, however, required to limit the size of their generation capacity to 
the combined annual energy usage of the facilities sharing the net metering 
credits.178 If the aggregating entity has excess credits at the end of the annual 
period, the utility will compensate the entity at the avoided cost rate.179 
D. Colorado Net Metering Policy 
Colorado originally enacted renewable energy standards in 2004 and has 
updated those policies several times in the past decade.180 The state’s net me-
tering policies vary depending on the type of utility they apply to.181 The three 
                                                                                                                           
uploads/2014/01/Community-Virtual-and-Aggregate-net-metering-brief-sheet.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/7LAB-GAJS; see N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-4.1(b)(1)–(3). 
 169 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-4.2 (2014) (defining a net metering customer as one who owns 
the meter, but who may or may not be the same entity as the owner of the generator). 
 170 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-87(e)(4); New Jersey Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, 
supra note 158. 
 171 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-87(e)(4) (2012). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id.; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-7.3(a). 
 174 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 14:8-7.2–.3(b). 
 175 Id. § 14:8-7.3(b)(1)–(2). 
 176 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-7.2 (2014). 
 177 See id. § 14:8-7.3(a)(2) (lacking a specific capacity limit). 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. § 14:8-7.3(f). Like private net metering customers, public entities participating in aggregate 
net metering receive credits on a month-to-month basis, at the retail rate. Id. § 14:8-7.3(d). 
 180 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3651 (2014). 
 181 Id. § 723-3:3650(a) to -3:3650(c). 
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types of utilities included in the statute are investor-owned utilities (“IOUs”), 
municipal utilities, and cooperative utilities.182 
All three types of utilities in Colorado offer net metering to customers 
who produce renewable energy and consume the energy on-site.183 The cus-
tomer’s site may include buildings on contiguous property owned or leased by 
the customer.184 Colorado deems renewable energy resources to be solar, wind, 
geothermal, biomass, and hydroelectric energy.185 
Customers in an IOU’s territory are required to limit the capacity of their 
generation system to no more than 120 percent of the customer’s average an-
nual electricity usage.186 In contrast, customers served by a cooperative or mu-
nicipal utility are subject to more specific limitations.187 Residential customers 
may only install generation systems up to ten kWs, whereas commercial and 
industrial customers are limited to up to twenty-five kW systems.188 
Each type of utility compensates a customer’s monthly excess generation 
by crediting the customer at the retail rate on the next monthly bill.189 The 
utilities vary, however, in how they must settle a customer’s excess credits at 
the end of a given year.190 IOU customers can choose to be compensated at the 
avoided cost rate for unused credits at the end of the year, or, instead, make a 
one-time choice to have the credits roll over month-to-month indefinitely.191 
Cooperative and municipal utilities are given discretion to compensate cus-
tomers for annual excess generation in a manner the utility deems appropri-
ate.192 
                                                                                                                           
 182 Id. An IOU is a private business enterprise owned by shareholder investors. JIM LAZAR, REG-
ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 9 (2011), available 
at http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/645, archived at http://perma.cc/G4AC-DUBW. 
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In 2010, in an effort to encourage broader use of solar energy, the Colora-
do legislature authorized the creation of community solar gardens (“CSGs”), a 
form of community net metering.193 A CSG is a solar array shared by subscrib-
ers who pay to own a subscription in the CSG.194 In return, subscribers receive 
credits to offset their monthly utility bill in proportion to their paid interest in 
the CSG.195 CSG subscriptions are only available to residential, commercial, 
and industrial customers served by IOUs.196 A minimum of ten subscribers 
must participate in a CSG for one to function.197 
Subscribers to a CSG need only live within the same municipality or 
county as the solar array; there is no requirement that the solar generation fa-
cility be on the same or contiguous property as the consumer.198 Further, third 
parties are permitted to own and operate CSGs.199 Similar to on-site net meter-
ing customers in Colorado, CSG subscribers receive a credit on their next 
monthly bill in the event the CSG produces more electricity than the subscrib-
ers used during the month.200 If a CSG produces excess electricity over the 
course of the year, the IOU is not required to compensate the CSG’s subscrib-
ers.201 Instead, the credits for each subscriber roll over month-to-month indefi-
nitely.202 
IV. OPTIMIZING NET METERING POLICIES 
Net metering is an important incentive for utility customers hoping to in-
stall on-site renewable energy generation systems.203 By helping energy con-
sumers recover the large upfront costs associated with small-scale renewable 
energy generation systems, net metering policies have led to a striking growth 
                                                                                                                           
 193 Id. § 40-2-127. One aim of community solar gardens is to offer renters and low-income cus-
tomers the opportunity to participate in solar energy net metering. Id. 
 194 Id. § 40-2-127(2)(b)(II); Welcome, SOLAR GARDENS CMTY. POWER, http://www.solargardens.
org/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4QE7-3F7V. 
 195 COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-127(2)(b)(II) to -127(2)(b)(III). A single CSG subscriber may not 
own more than a forty percent interest in the usable electricity of a CSG. COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-
3:3665(a)(I)(A) (2014). 
 196 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-127(7) (providing that the CSG program does not apply to co-
operative or municipally-owned utilities). 
 197 Id. § 40-2-127(2)(b)(I). 
 198 COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-127(2)(b)(II) (2014). The geographical limits are relaxed if a sub-
scriber lives in a rural area; a subscriber who lives in a county with a population of less than 20,000 
can subscribe to a CSG in another county. Id. 
 199 Id. § 40-2-127(2)(b)(I). The IOU itself may be the owner of the CSG. Id. The statute also al-
lows subscribers to organize an ownership group amongst themselves. Id. 
 200 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3665(c)(III) (2014). 
 201 Id. 
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in the installation of such systems.204 In 2003, the Energy Information Admin-
istration (“EIA”) reported a total of approximately 7000 net metering custom-
ers in the United States.205 By 2010, the number of net metering customers had 
multiplied by more than twenty times, to over 150,000.206 These customers and 
their utilities are realizing the many recognized benefits of net metering and 
distributed renewable generation.207 
Despite the growing participation in net metering programs, net metering 
customers still comprise a small fraction of one percent of energy consumers in 
the United States.208 States can and should do more to promote and incentivize 
net metering, and they would do well to follow the examples set by Colorado, 
Massachusetts, and New Jersey.209 Each state is a leader among the net meter-
ing states, and yet, there are wide discrepancies in their policies.210 These dis-
crepancies exemplify how legislatures can tailor net metering policies to pro-
mote specific state energy and environmental goals while also navigating fed-
eral law and Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) guidelines.211 
A. Comparing Colorado, Massachusetts, and New Jersey Policies 
1. Comparing Size Limits, Credit Systems, and Customer Choice 
How a state limits the size of electricity generation systems eligible for 
net metering is important because it affects how much of a customer’s electric-
ity need can be met with on-site generation and how quickly a customer will 
realize a return on investment.212 Due to the upfront costs of installing a re-
newable generation system on a customer’s property, smaller systems are more 
expensive than larger systems, on a per-watt basis.213 Therefore, state policies 
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that allow customers to scale systems to meet their needs provide the best in-
centive for net metering.214 
Colorado, Massachusetts, and New Jersey have each amended their net 
metering statutes to expand the allowable size of renewable energy generation 
systems.215 For example, Massachusetts has set specific kilowatt (kW) or meg-
awatt (MW) capacities based on the class of customer. 216 Colorado and New 
Jersey, meanwhile, have shifted the metric of allowable size from a specific 
MW capacity to a capacity based on the customer’s average electricity con-
sumption.217 This approach better incentivizes new net metering customers 
because it gives them the flexibility to meet their energy needs regardless of 
the size of the building or facility.218 
The way in which net metering customers are credited for their excess 
generation by the utility is another key policy component of any state policy, 
because it directly affects a customer’s energy bill savings.219 Customers who 
receive credit for the power they generate on-site at the full retail rate earn ap-
proximately four times the wholesale value of the electricity.220 Thus, giving 
customers the retail rate represents a straightforward financial incentive to in-
stall a renewable energy generation system on-site.221 
Massachusetts credits Class I and II facilities (facilities anywhere from 
zero to one MW in size) at roughly the retail rate for excess electricity in a giv-
en month.222 Colorado and New Jersey both incentivize net metering by credit-
ing monthly excess generation at the full retail value.223 In New Jersey, excess 
credits at the end of the year are purchased by the utility at the avoided cost 
rate.224 In contrast, Colorado and Massachusetts allow customers to roll over 
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credits month to month on an indefinite basis.225 Customers in Colorado and 
Massachusetts thus continuously receive the higher retail rate for their power 
from year to year, whereas New Jersey customers’ credits expire and revert in 
value from the retail rate to the avoided cost rate.226 To provide the best incen-
tives to consumers, states should design policies like Colorado’s and Massa-
chusetts’ regarding credit payments, as they give customers the largest possible 
value for their generation.227 
Due to the variety of customer energy consumption patterns, states should 
also craft policies that give customers flexibility to meet their unique energy 
needs.228 Allowing customers to scale their on-site generation systems based 
on average energy consumption is one example of customer flexibility adopted 
by Colorado and New Jersey.229 Another example is New Jersey’s policy of 
allowing customers to choose when their annual billing cycle begins.230 Yet 
another is that Colorado gives customers the choice to have credits roll over 
indefinitely or to receive a year-end payment for excess credits.231 Because of 
the flexibility provided to customers by these policies, there are expanded op-
portunities to take advantage of the benefits of net metering.232 
2. Community and Virtual Net Metering 
Community net metering policies are valuable incentives because they in-
clude customers who may otherwise be unable to reap the benefits of renewa-
ble power generation.233 States that allow for community net metering facili-
tate broader participation in renewable generation, particularly among custom-
ers whose property is not suitable for a small-scale installation or for those to 
whom the upfront costs of renewable generation are too high.234 
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Colorado and Massachusetts both permit net metering so that credits cre-
ated by a renewable energy system may be allocated to meters of multiple cus-
tomers, even those not physically on or next to the property of the generator.235 
New Jersey, alternatively, only allows public entities to share credits from a 
single renewable energy system.236 New Jersey’s policy helps government 
agencies reduce their energy costs by allocating credits across multiple build-
ings but, unlike the policies of Colorado and Massachusetts, it is not inclusive 
of private energy consumers, and in particular, of low-income and renting cus-
tomers.237 
States should aim to include all customers who would like to benefit from 
distributed renewable energy generation, not merely those customers who can 
afford the upfront costs of installation.238 Community net metering policies 
such as Colorado’s expand access to distributed renewable energy by providing 
customers the opportunity to benefit from net metering without bearing the 
entire cost of a distributed renewable energy installation.239 Furthermore, 
community and virtual net metering programs improve access to the benefits 
of distributed renewable energy by streamlining the process of connecting a 
distributed generation system to the grid.240 The owner of a distributed renew-
able energy system may have to engage in complex negotiations with the utili-
ty in order to interconnect to the grid—a process that can effectively be a bar-
rier to installing a renewable energy system.241 This barrier is decreased how-
ever, in community and virtual net metering programs in which a single con-
nection to the grid can benefit many customers.242 
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B. Addressing the Inadequacies of the FERC Decisions 
1. MidAmerican and Sun Edison: Limited Guideposts 
The FERC decisions MidAmerican Energy Company and Sun Edison, 
LLC were adjudications to resolve the specific issues raised by the particular 
facts of each case.243 In neither decision did FERC contemplate the many poli-
cy variations employed by different states.244 Nonetheless, these decisions 
comprise the primary framework within which states shape their net metering 
policies.245 States attempt to heed the orders despite the limited scope of the 
decisions, and thus leave their respective policies on tenuous legal footing.246 
An example of a limitation of the FERC decisions is the time interval that 
constitutes a billing cycle.247 The length of the billing cycle is crucial to net me-
tering policies because FERC has made clear that federal law applies when a 
customer makes a net sale of electricity to the utility at the end of the billing cy-
cle.248 Before MidAmerican, FERC had found that net metering was appropriate 
over a one-hour period but that other reasonable billing periods could be permit-
ted.249 In MidAmerican, FERC determined—based on the particular facts of that 
case—that net metering is allowed over a one-month billing cycle.250 Thus, 
states looking to FERC for guidance after MidAmerican know that a net meter-
ing customer who sends excess electricity to the utility is not subject to federal 
jurisdiction as long as the excess electricity is measured between one hour and 
one month of time.251 
States have followed the finding in MidAmerican that one month is an 
appropriate interval to allow customers to send excess electricity to the utili-
ty.252 At the same time, without guidance from FERC, most states have adopt-
ed one year as the cutoff, after which time accumulated credits are reconciled: 
either taken over by the utility or bought from the customer at the avoided cost 
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rate.253 By requiring net metering customers to start over every year, states are 
essentially lowering the value of customer-generated electricity from the retail 
rate to the avoided cost rate.254 The value of the electricity is diminished even 
further in states where the customer’s accumulated electricity is simply forfeit-
ed to the utility at the end of the annual period.255 Because the rate at which net 
metering customers are credited for their electricity is a key incentive, the effi-
cacy of net metering policies is burdened by states’ uncertain efforts to comply 
with the MidAmerican decision.256 
Some states, such as Colorado and Massachusetts, allow accumulated 
credits to roll over month-to-month indefinitely.257 This policy is a win-win: 
net metering customers in these states receive the optimal payback (the retail 
rate) and the states comply with FERC’s finding in MidAmerican that one 
month is a permissible interval for customers to send excess electricity to utili-
ties.258 States like Colorado and Massachusetts have thus followed the limited 
guidance of FERC while also providing potential net metering customers with 
an attractive incentive to invest in small-scale renewable energy.259 
The appropriate size and capacity of on-site renewable energy systems is 
another example of the inadequacy of FERC’s net metering decisions.260 After 
Sun Edison, state policymakers seeking to avoid federal preemption know only 
that the net flow of power must be from the utility to the customer.261 States 
have cautiously phrased their net metering rules to account for this finding.262 
New Jersey and Colorado’s regulations exemplify this caution by limiting the 
size of eligible renewable energy systems to only meet the needs of the cus-
tomer.263 Although New Jersey and Colorado’s size limits are based on a per-
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centage of the customer’s annual energy needs and thus are more flexible than 
permitting only a fixed output of electricity, these limits nonetheless restrict 
the potential of distributed generation.264 
Increasing the allowable size of net metering could spur larger investment 
and development in renewable energy.265 For example, a commercial or indus-
trial building owner may have the capacity to install enough renewable energy 
to produce 200 percent of the building’s needs.266 Instead, state policies dis-
courage that level of excess generation in order to avoid FERC jurisdiction.267 
To foster development of distributed renewable energy sources, state net me-
tering policies should be able to permit larger generation capacity without fear 
of federal preemption.268 
2. States as Policy Laboratories 
Community and virtual net metering policies such as those employed by 
Colorado and Massachusetts are indicative of the kind of state-level creativity 
that can be used to expand the use of renewable energy.269 States have imple-
mented virtual and community net metering policies to broaden access to the 
benefits of net metering, but also to maintain compliance with the FERC deci-
sions.270 Under Massachusetts’ virtual net metering program, for example, a 
host customer who generates excess electricity may allocate those credits to 
another customer rather than forfeit the power to the utility.271 In this virtual 
net metering scenario, multiple customers receive roughly the retail value for 
the electricity, rather than the host customer forfeiting the excess electricity or 
receiving only the avoided cost value at the end of the year.272 Absent this crea-
tive policy, electricity left over at the end of the year could only be bought at 
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the avoided cost rate in order to comply with federal law and the FERC deci-
sions.273 
States can better foster renewable energy development if larger generation 
capacities are permitted.274 After the MidAmerican and Sun Edison decisions, 
customers are discouraged from investing in larger capacity on-site generators 
because doing so increases the likelihood that they will be net producers of 
electricity and thus face onerous federal regulation.275 FERC regulations, how-
ever, specifically exempt small-scale qualifying facilities (“QFs”) that generate 
fewer than twenty MW from federal scrutiny of wholesale sales.276 FERC 
could thus operate within its existing regulations by permitting an on-site gen-
eration facility up to twenty MW to be a net seller of electricity, regardless of 
the facility’s consumption-to-sale ratio.277 Lifting the requirement that net me-
tering customers be net consumers of electricity would free states to craft poli-
cies that allow customers to install larger generation systems that add more 
renewable power to the grid.278 
States’ efforts to comply with FERC’s decisions in MidAmerican and Sun 
Edison have limited the potential of net metering policies.279 Nonetheless, 
states are well situated to implement new net metering policies to attract in-
vestment in renewable energy.280 States should thus be encouraged to be policy 
laboratories in order to continue developing inclusive programs like virtual and 
community net metering.281 
Net metering is a popular policy incentive for renewable energy, and im-
portantly, it is one that is successful.282 In order to foster the proliferation of 
net metering in the various states, net metering policies require a more solid 
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legal foundation than a FERC adjudication.283 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 
improved the policy landscape, but it did not do enough, and thus states have 
continued to be the drivers of net metering policies, and have crafted creative 
programs without federal legal clarity.284 FERC can rectify this situation, and 
in so doing, allow states to continue in their roles as net metering policy labor-
atories that foster the growth of distributed renewable generation, by providing 
more clear and transparent federal guidelines for net metering policies.285 
CONCLUSION 
Generating electricity from renewable sources distributed throughout the 
power grid, or distributed generation, has environmental, financial, and relia-
bility benefits. The primary policy tool used to incentivize distributed genera-
tion is net metering, a billing device that allows customers who produce their 
own power to offset their electricity bills with the electricity they generate. 
Forty-three states currently have net metering policies, and most states have 
crafted their policies with available incentives that vary greatly from one state 
to another. As states like Colorado, Massachusetts, and New Jersey have at-
tempted to forge policies that provide the best incentives for distributed renew-
able energy development however, they are at risk of significant federal 
preemption issues that not only burden those states’ continuing efforts, but 
shroud their current policies in damaging uncertainty. 
Although the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has ex-
pressly allowed net metering, it did so in two adjudications that have very lim-
ited precedential value. FERC is thus limiting the potential of net metering 
policies by restricting key components such as the permissible size of a cus-
tomer’s generation system and the amount of compensation available. Because 
of the importance of net metering specifically, and environmentally safe, re-
newable energy more generally, FERC should recognize the important policy 
work being done at the state level and promote distributed generation by 
providing clearer net metering policy guidelines for the states to rely on.
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